-Rakesh Naga Chinta
Deterministic and indeterministic views were seen all throughout history and the distinction actually shapes and furthers the possibility of a connection which can be seen, lived through in our daily lives. The idea of quantum indeterminacy is compatible for various scopes of determinacy.
The consideration of “determining” actually involves that each and every one of us should believe that there lies only one possible outcome or future, where free will has neither any cause of effect against and so “fate” is actually predetermined. “We always have a choice”, whether we taking it or not: does it actually predict and determine our possible future outcome or is it just a personal predicament of our beliefs, that it may? How can far free will be taken into account for? If we do consider the possibility of free will affecting our outcomes, then there must be an infinite number of futures or outcomes which are limited to only our scope of choices, which are hence determined by free will.
I agree on personal opinion which I will support via arguments that free will is always existential and can be altered and controlled by us anytime, but we must go through certain, particular fixed predetermined events of determinism.Even though I am biased on the notion of the compatibility of free will and determinism, we will rationally argue the incompatibility as well throughout the following arguments.
Determinism and free will are highly compatible even though in some cases they are also incompatible, rationally, a scenario where determinism and free will may be incompatible may be an instance where the essence of control over one’s life and its outcomes are primarily based on one’s daily behavior, tasks-done and work undertook. Where on the other hand, determinism comes into play where fixed events are a must to be undergone, independent of choices of free will.
Let us consider a scenario where free will and determinism are in perfect sync via a simple analogy. A game of billiards can be described completely using the concepts of classical mechanics. Nothing in that description indicates that balls can move through each other, affect each other at a distance, or be both in and out of a pocket. Yet, the balls, table, sticks, etc. are all made of particles which do display these quantum phenomena. In fact, a quantum description of billiards rather misses the mark while a classical explanation is perfectly satisfactory to our argument. This doesn’t make one less valid than the other. In the same way, at the cellular level, chemistry may be the best explanatory and descriptive framework for analyzing what’s going on. Yet, at the phenomenological level, free will is a far better way of describing events. The neurological explanation could be orthogonal to the discussion of free will; if the low-level case is completely deterministic, it still feels like we have many degrees of freedom at the level of consciousness. If this analogy holds, neurological determinism is no more an argument against free will than classical physics is against the working of quantum mechanics.
Van Inwagen’s no choice theory states that if one were to have to pursue a certain action “A”, without escape, and if A leads to B, then B is a must as well. Van Inwagen stresses the conflict with the possibility of free will. Given from his famous No Choice Principle, which seems undeniably accurate, coming from a clearly biased person of compatibility: How can one have a choice about an instance which is an inevitable consequence of something one has no choice to the ether for? The general compatibilist denies the No Choice Principle. But it is important to be rational in such an instance and look into the counter-arguments which are critical in this situation, our choices are open to free will, but are determined by a greater extent on the whole, due to the scale of the scope, which in this case is the future. One can observe how a chain of events is actually tied via the no choice theory and hence we can say that since the chain of events is linked, they provide an option for a fixed structure, which in this obvious case is nothing more than determinism. But how does free will come into this structure? Well, we may not have a choice to stop at a middle of an instance between an event of A and B, since from the No Choice Theory, it is an inescapable event. But we can choose whether to pursue A at the beginning at all, this is the choice which we have and hence free will comes to play. From the above arguments, we can see how free will and determinism are purely compatible, but we must also consider this is not the case for all regarding customizable events, for instance, our daily lives: we have a choice to do what we want but we cannot forgo the determined circumstances.
Most physicists believe that uncertainness is metaphysics, not epistemological — an inherent feature of reality, not simply a limit of information. A low minority disagree. We have the chaos theory, which may be a second elementary qualification of determinism: prediction can solely be pretty much as good because of the activity accuracy of initial conditions. In alternative words, to accurately predict future states, we need infinite precision — an impossibility: due to the fact we can never accurately predict our future in short bursts, even though we may have the possibility of the outcomes to come forth. Such chaotic behavior is additionally extremely interactive, inflicting hyper-exponential uncertainty. Suppose making an attempt to predict the weather precisely one year from currently at an awfully specific location: unimaginable, even in theory.Hence our argument relying on the fact of determinism stands true even though we consider the possibility of false positives or false negatives.
In conclusion, the clear implication of these is that the only kind of determinism viable today is one that specifically excludes predictability — it is inherently impossible to predict the future of complex systems such as personal choice of action, complex issues which are independent on the probability of cause, even though determined events are always fixed.Hence so, human activity, in particular, cannot be predicted — not even in theory. The inherent lack of predictability means that the only viable interpretation of determinism implies that the future is not determined in any meaningful way. It cannot in principle be determined: we always have a choice.On the other hand, this new perspective opens up the possibility of humans having meaningful control over their destiny, and not just one based on the vagrancies of quantum dice. The only way we can know the future is by living it — while shaping it with an uncertain determinism.